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Regional Mismatch and Unemployment:  




This paper describes the functioning of a two-region economy 
characterized by asymmetric wage-setting. Labor market tightness in one 
region (the leading-region) affects wages in the whole economy. In 
equilibrium, net labor demand shifts towards the leading region raise 
unemployment in the rest of the economy and leave regional wages 
unchanged, causing an increase in aggregate unemployment. This model 
has some success in explaining the evolution of regional unemployment 
rates in Italy during the period 1977-1998. Based on SHIW micro data on 
earnings and ISTAT data on unemployment rates we find strong evidence 
that wages in Italy only respond to labor market tightness in the North. We 
estimate that around one third of the increase in aggregate unemployment in 
Italy can be explained by regional mismatch, mainly due to an excess labor 
supply growth in the South. 
 
JEL Classification: E24, J23, J31 
 
Keywords: Regional imbalances, Wage curve, Unemployment. 
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1. Introduction 
Italian unemployment grew roughly monotonically between the late 1970s and the late 
1980s, increasing from about 7% in 1977 to almost 12% in 1989, and remained roughly 
untrended thereafter. The rise in unemployment during the 1980s was mainly 
concentrated in the South. While Northern unemployment, lower for a start, stayed 
basically untrended, moving from approximately 6% in 1977 to 7% in 1998, Southern 
unemployment more than doubled in this 21-years span, increasing from 10% to 22% 
(see Figure 1). Shocks to aggregate labor demand, linked to the oil price shocks, the fall 
in the investment/GDP ratio and the fiscal adjustment implied by Maastricht criteria, as 
well as institutional rigidities, seem to have played a role (see Padoa-Schioppa 1999). 
However, such forces do not seem to have prevented the quasi full-employment in the 
North, while hitting seriously the Southern economy. It seems therefore that investigating 
the source and the characteristics of regional imbalances is the most natural way of 
understanding the dynamics of the Italian labor market, and the rise in its unemployment 
rate. 
This is the approach of this paper, which aims at evaluating whether the unbalanced 
evolution of labor demand and supply across different geographical areas - which we 
refer to as regional mismatch - is partly responsible for the increase in aggregate 
unemployment. 
The question of whether regional mismatch carries the responsibility for the rise in 
southern (and hence aggregate) unemployment has relevant policy implications and lies 
at the core of the current Italian debate on the performance of its labor market and the 
increased disparities between the North and the South. Implicitly, the above hypothesis is 
contrasted with the widespread view that exogenous changes in regional wage pressure - 
defined as any factor affecting regional wages at given unemployment - bear the main 
responsibility for the rise in Southern unemployment. Such view is reported in several 
studies on the Italian labor market (see, among others, Bodo and Sestito 1991 and 
Brunello et al. 2001), and has often motivated IMF policy recommendations for Italy. In 
particular, IMF (2000, p. 19) states that for given unemployment rates, labor costs 
declined considerably more in the Center-North than in the country as a whole. Labor 
demand, however, evolved quite similarly across the country [...] and this needs to be 
borne in mind in designing a wage policy to boost employment. Although it is indisputable 
that some rise in relative wage pressure did occur in the South (and we will report 
evidence on this), the point we make in this paper is that it cannot be blamed for the 
entire rise in Southern unemployment. 
Since the early work by Lilien (1982), the study of labor market mismatch (along a 
number of dimensions) and its relationship with aggregate unemployment has been 
pursued actively by economists. Lilien (1982) interprets mismatch as sectoral turbulence, 
and argues that the variance of the sectoral growth rates in employment should 
adequately account for fluctuations in employment due to mismatch. He finds that the 
mismatch hypothesis has some success in explaining US employment data but his 
findings have been effectively criticized (Abraham and Katz 1986, Blanchard and 
Diamond 1989). Layard et al. (1991, chapter 6) follow a different approach and measure 
mismatch by the variance of sectoral unemployment rates. They conclude that, under the 
assumption that ``wage behavior in a sector is caused primarily by unemployment in that 
sector rather than by unemployment in some leading sector [...], mismatch has increased 
in no country [...] studied except Sweden.' 
Italy makes no exception in the findings of Layard et al. (1991). A simple inspection of 
the data in Figure 1 shows why one might come to this conclusion: during the 1977-89  5
period, while unemployment diverged across Italian regions, wage differentials shrunk in 
favor of the South. Changes in relative wages across geographical areas correlate 
positively with changes in relative unemployment, casting some doubts on whether 
regional shifts in (net) labor demand can be held responsible for the increase in 
aggregate unemployment in Italy. However, as we will argue below, this conclusion is 
specific to the wage-setting model adopted in Layard et al. (1991). In particular, we show 
that alternative wage-setting hypotheses deliver quite different rationalizations of the 
available evidence on wage and unemployment differentials. 
In order to investigate this issue, we provide a model of a two-region economy, in 
which wages nationwide only respond to the tightness of the labor market in the North. 
Such an asymmetric wage-setting model - for which we provide empirical evidence - may 
be motivated by the centralized structure of wage bargaining, which allows economic 
conditions prevailing in tighter markets to affect wages everywhere in the economy (see 
Fabiani et al. 2001). We show that, if this is the case, a shift in net labor demand towards 
the North generates rising unemployment in the South and stable wage differentials. The 
intuition is as follows: a rise in labor demand in the North tends to reduce local 
unemployment and, through wage setting, increase wage claims in the whole economy. 
Higher wage claims in turn reduce employment in both regions. As a result of the two 
effects, equilibrium unemployment remains unchanged in the North and increases in the 
South, thus aggregate unemployment increases. Regional wages, determined by 
Northern unemployment, remain unaffected by labor demand shifts. Observed changes in 
relative wages (see Fig. 1) can therefore only be rationalized by changes in regional 
wage pressure, but this by no means implies that wage pressure is the exclusive 
explanation for the rise in regional unemployment differentials and aggregate 
unemployment. 
It is important to recognize that a leading-region model of wage determination is not 
necessary to deliver aggregate unemployment effects of higher regional mismatch. It is 
known since the seminal work of Lipsey (1960) that higher dispersion of local 
unemployment rates can negatively affect the aggregate performance of the labor market 
(a mechanism also exploited in later work by Layard et al. 1991 and Manacorda and 
Petrongolo 1999). However, this effect is second order insofar it relies crucially on the 
convexity of the wage curve, i.e. on the fact that wages are more sensitive to 
unemployment when the labor market is tighter. In our model, by contrast, regional 
imbalances in labor demand have first order effects on aggregate unemployment, 
independently of any non-linearity in wage setting. 
By studying the effects of regional mismatch when the wage-setting process is 
asymmetric, this paper brings together two strands of literature. The idea that wage 
claims in Italy are mainly driven by the unemployment conditions prevailing in the North 
has received wide support in empirical studies of the Italian labor market (see Bodo and 
Sestito, 1994, Casavola et al. 1995, and Brunello 2000). Also, pronounced 
unemployment disparities between the North and the South of Italy have prompted 
several authors to investigate the determinants and the consequences of such disparities 
on aggregate performance (see Attanasio and Padoa-Schioppa, 1991, Brunello et al. 
2000, 2001, and references therein). The novel contribution of this paper is to investigate 
the consequences of regional shocks in the demand and the supply of labor when wages 
nationwide respond to labor market conditions in the North. 
In doing this, we treat regional changes in labor supply and thus interregional 
migration as exogenous. The effects of endogenous labor migration, eventually 
equalizing geographical differences in expected income, have long been recognized 
(Harris and Todaro 1970 and Hall 1970) and embodied in the long-run equilibrium of 
more recent models of regional mismatch (Pissarides and Wadsworth 1987 and Jackman 
et al. 1991). However, in empirical terms exogenous regional labor force does not seem 
an unrealistic assumption for Italy where, even in the face of persistent and increasing  6
differences in expected income across regions, internal migration has declined steadily 
(see, among others, Attanasio and Padoa-Schioppa 1991, and Faini et al. 1997). This 
suggests that migration costs must be substantial. We discuss this issue further in 
Section 4. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 proposes a model of a two-
region economy, with a leading-region wage setting mechanism, and illustrates the 
effects of regional mismatch on aggregate unemployment. Section 3 estimates a regional 
wage equation for Italy over the period 1977-1998, using micro data from the Bank of 
Italy Survey of Households' Income and Wealth. We find that, conditional on a set of 
individual attributes and regional trends, wages nationwide respond to the unemployment 
rate in the North. In Section 4 we assess the impact of regional mismatch and regional 
wage pressure on aggregate unemployment, using the framework of Section 2. Sections 
5 discusses our main findings and Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. The theoretical framework 
 
In this section we develop a simple two-region model of the labor market, which illustrates 
how regional demand and supply shocks affect the aggregate unemployment rate when 
wage setting is asymmetric. By asymmetric wage setting we mean a scenario in which 
the labor market conditions prevailing in one of the two regions (the so-called leading 
region, which is generally the low-unemployment one) affect wage claims throughout the 
economy. A comparison of the predictions of this model with one characterized by 
symmetric wage setting is given in Section 2.6. 
 
 
2.1 The economy 
 
The economy consists of region 1 (the leading region) and region 2 (the secondary 
region), each endowed with a large number of identical firms and a homogeneous labor 
force. Firms in each region produce a homogeneous regional good employing local labor, 
and sell it in competitive markets. Individuals in each region supply labor inelastically and 
have identical preferences defined over consumption of both regional goods. 
Individuals are either employed or unemployed. If employed, they earn a wage 
determined in their regional labor market; if unemployed, they earn some unemployment 
income, financed with a lump-sum tax on the wage of the employed. For the sake of 
simplicity, but with no loss of generality, we normalize unemployment income (and 
consumption) to zero. 
Goods are perfectly mobile, as each regional product is traded in the whole economy, 
but both workers and firms are immobile. 
Equilibrium in regional labor markets is determined by the interaction between a labor 
demand schedule (stemming from profit-maximizing decisions of firms) and a wage-
setting schedule relating wages bargained to unemployment. Wage-setting is asymmetric 
in the sense that the unemployment rate in region 1 drives wage claims in both region 1 
and region 2. Assume, as it seems reasonable, that consumers are indifferent as to 
whether a given good is produced in region 1 or region 2 (i.e. type 1 goods produced in 
region 1 are perfect substitutes for type 1 goods produced in region 2). 
Regional demand and supply shocks affect both regional and aggregate 
unemployment due to regional specialization in production. The assumption of complete 
regional specialization stems from regional comparative advantages in the presence of  7
constant returns to labor. Let's imagine that region 1 has a comparative advantage in the 
production of good 1, and that initially each region produces both goods. Labor is freely 
mobile across sectors within regions, but immobile across regions, and products are 
freely mobile across the whole economy. This implies that workers in each region are 
paid the same wage, independent of the sector in which they are employed, and that the 
price of each good is homogeneous across regions. In this case, even slight comparative 
advantages would drive the equilibrium in each region towards a corner solution in which 




2.2 Labor demand 
 
The first building block of our model is a labor demand schedule for each region, which is 
derived from profit maximization at the firm level. Firms in each region employ local labor 
and sell their output in the whole economy. We characterize equilibrium in the market for 
each regional good, and from this we derive the labor market schedule in each region. 
The demand for regional goods is determined by the solution to the optimization 
problem of the representative worker in each region. Individuals in region  r   ( 2 , 1 r = ) 
have constant-returns Cobb-Douglas preferences defined over consumption of goods 
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where the parameters   α ≡ α1   and   α − ≡ α 1 2   represent consumer tastes for the two 
regional goods,   1 p   and   2 p   represent their prices, and   r w   represents regional 
wages.
2 Note that preferences are identical across regions. The first-order conditions to 
the maximization in (1) are:  
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from which it follows that  α  and   α − 1   represent the expenditure shares for each good 
for households in both regions:  
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On the production side, we assume that both goods are produced according to a 
linear technology that uses only labor as a factor of production. Denoting by   jr Y   the 
                                                 
1This result is based on the (reasonable) assumption that consumers are indifferent as to whether a given good 
is produced in region 1 or region 2 (i.e. type 1 goods produced in region 1 would be perfect substitutes for type 
1 goods produced in region 2). 
2To check the robustness of our results to the parametric specification of preferences, in Appendix A we allow 
for CES preferences, with an arbitrary value of the elasticity of substitution between   r 1 c   and   r 2 c   and we 
estimate the impact of regional mismatch as   σ   ranges between 0 and 2.  8
output of firm   j   in region   , r   the firm level production function is   , N A Y jr r jr =   where  
jr N   denotes firm-level employment and   r A   denotes the local state of technology. 
Aggregation across firms gives regional output:  
 
(4) , 2 , 1 r , N A Y r r r = =  
 
where   . N N jr j r ∑ =   
Market clearing in region 1 and region 2 implies   
, N N c N c N c Y 2 c
c










 + = 2 c
c
1 21 2 N N c Y
21
22   respectively, i.e. 
the production of each good must equal its consumption in the whole economy. Given the 
first order conditions in equation (2),   , w / w c / c c / c 2 1 22 21 12 11 = =   which, combined 
with market-clearing, implies   . Y / Y c / c c / c 2 1 22 12 21 11 = =   Substituting this into (3) 
allows to rewrite  α  and   α − 1   as shares of regional products in national output:  
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Profit maximization of firms gives   , A p w r r r =     , 2 , 1 r =   which implies that  α  and  
α − 1   also represent the shares of regional labor income in the total wage bill:  
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In this stylized model, one can therefore read off changes in preferences for goods 
produced in each region by simply looking at the wage bill share of its workers. It is easy 
to see why this is the case:  α  is the share of workers' expenditure on goods produced 
in region 1, irrespective of where they reside. Because of perfect competition, this is also 
the share of revenues over national output accruing to firms in region 1. Because of linear 
technology, this is in turn equivalent to the share of the wage bill accruing to workers 
residing in region 1. Similarly for region 2. 
Finally, because preferences are identical across regions and homogeneous of 
degree 1, and the total wage bill is entirely spent on consumption, in equilibrium total 
expenditure equals total utility, or   () ( )
α − α = +
1
2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 N A N A N w N w.
3 Embodying this 
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for region 1, and similarly for region 2, where   1 u   and   2 u  denote the unemployment 
rates of the leading and the secondary region, respectively, and  l  and   l 1−   denote the 
corresponding labor force shares. 
                                                 
3Note that 
α − α = +
1
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α − α = α   Given the market clearing condition this in 
turn implies   () () () () ( ) [ ] . N A N A / N w Y Y / Y p
1
2 2 1 1 1 1
1
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α − α α − α = = α   9
Note finally that equation (7) describes a downward sloping labor demand schedule, 
i.e. a positive relationship between   r w   and   r u,    , 2 , 1 r =   despite the absence of 
diminishing returns to labor in production. In our model, such relationship stems from the 
consumption response of a change in regional wages. If, say,   1 w   rises,   1 p   also rises 
(given   1 1 1 A / w p = ): as good  1  is now more expensive   11 c   and   12 c   fall, therefore  
1 Y   falls and   1 u   rises. In other words, a rise in local wages translates into a rise in the 
price of locally produced goods, and this tends to harm local employment. 
 
 
2.3 Regional mismatch 
 
Region-specific demand and supply variables are represented by  α  and  l   
respectively. They are relative indicators and therefore are meant to isolate purely 
regional shocks from aggregate changes. As mentioned in Section 2.1, we treat labor 
force changes as exogenous, i.e. we do not allow for differences in employment 
prospects to affect migration or labor force participation. 
A measure of mismatch across regions is given by the index  
 












This is an indicator of relative shifts in the demand for goods (workers) produced 
(employed) in the two regions, net of relative labor supply shifts. It has the desirable 
property of having the same absolute magnitude and opposite signs for the two regions.
4 
A convenient approximation to our index is  
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w
w
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deriving from the first order Taylor approximation   () x x 1 ln − ≅ − , valid for   x   close 
enough to zero. We expect that a shift in net relative demand towards region 1 (region 2) 
will either reduce its unemployment rate relative to region 2 (region 1), or raise its relative 
wages, or both. We show below that when we close the model with a wage setting 
schedule for each region, wages are unaffected by net demand shifts, and regional shifts 






                                                 
4Previous concepts of mismatch (see Jackman et al. 1991) focus on the dispersion of relative unemployment 
rates, rather than on the direct evolution of sectoral demand and supply of labour. By focusing on the 
(endogenous) unemployment dispersion, the LNJ index does not distinguish pure  demand and supply 
imbalances from adjustments in relative wages and unemployment rates due to different sources. Some later 
work (Nickell and Bell 1995) focused directly on demand/supply measures, but used absolute rather than 
relative measures of mismatch, given by   ), l / ln( d α   which would not necessarily have the same absolute 
magnitude and opposite signs for the two groups of workers considered. A relative measures of mismatch, 
similar to the one adopted in this paper, is used by Manacorda and Petrongolo (1999).  10
As far as wage setting is concerned, we consider a downward-sloping relationship 
between wages and unemployment.
5 In particular, we adopt the following double-
logarithmic specification  
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where wages set in the whole economy respond negatively to the unemployment rate of 
the leading region (region 1). Wage pressure, defined as any residual factor affecting 





Equilibrium unemployment and wages are determined by labor demand (7) and wage 
setting (10). 
Let us define the change in aggregate wage pressure at constant factor shares as  
() ; dz 1 dz dz 2 1 α − + α =   and similarly the change in labor productivity at constant factor 
shares as   () 2 1 A ln d 1 A ln d A ln d α − + α = . By total differentiation of equations (7) and 
(10) we obtain the equilibrium change in local unemployment rates:  
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Equations (11) and (12) illustrate the effect of any exogenous shock on the 
unemployment rate of each region. 
Aggregate shocks, measured as the excess aggregate wage pressure  dz  over the 
feasible average wage growth, raise unemployment in both regions. Note that the 
feasible growth in the average wage is measured by the average increase in labor 
productivity,   A ln d , plus the welfare effect that each region enjoys for a change in tastes 
towards the good produced in the leading region (i.e.   
() ( ) α = α = d Y / Y ln d c / c ln V ln d 2 1 r 2 r 1 r ,   2 , 1 r = ). 
The wage pressure differential   1 2 dz dz −   raises unemployment in region 2, while 
leaving unemployment in region 1 unaffected. The intuition is the following: a rise in   
1 2 dz dz −   first generates higher relative wages in region 2 and, other things equal, an 
increase in   2 u   and a fall in   1 u . The second-round effect involves a generalized rise in 
wage claims, via the fall in   1 u   (equation), raising both unemployment rates. In 
equilibrium   1 u   stays unchanged and   2 u   increases. 
                                                 
5The existence of a inverse relationship between wages and unemployment is largely acknowdged in empirical 
research (Blanchflower and Oswald 1994 and Card 1995), although no single microfoundation is to date 
recongnized as superior to others. It is not in the scope of this paper to investigate such microfoundations. It has 
been argued that a downward sloping relationship between wages and unemployment may stem from wage 
bargaining (Manning 1993), efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984), or search frictions (Pissarides 2000). 
See Card (1995) for a discussion.  11
Finally, a net demand shift towards region 1 ( 0 D12 > ) also raises unemployment in 
region 2 and leaves unemployment in region 1 unchanged. Again, the negative effect on  
1 u  ( 0 du1 < ) of a net demand shift towards region 1 ( 0 D12 > ) turns out to be perfectly 
offset by the resulting rise in wage claims everywhere in the economy. The leading region 
is thus fully sterilized from sectoral shocks. 
The aggregate unemployment rate  u   is given by a weighted average of regional 
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The term in  dl  is a compositional effect, due to the inter-regional migration of the 
labor force. It tends to have a negative impact on aggregate unemployment if there are 
net migration flows towards the leading region, which is plausibly the low-unemployment 
one. Aggregate unemployment increases when aggregate wage pressure rises over the 
feasible real wage, when wage pressure in the secondary region grows faster than in the 
leading one, and when net demand shifts towards the leading region. The last two effects 
are solely induced by the unemployment response in the secondary region. 
As far wages are concerned, it follows from equations (10) and (11) that  
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i.e. in equilibrium wages only depend on deviations of regional wage pressure from its 
feasible trend, and are unaffected by net relative demand shocks. 
It is instructive to summarize the equilibrium conditions for unemployment and wage 
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which hold locally for low enough values of the unemployment rates. From equations (15) 
and (16), relative wages are only affected by relative wage pressure; while relative 
demand shifts only affect unemployment differentials. One could therefore infer the 
impact of demand and supply shifts over the unemployment differential by simply parsing 
out actual relative wage changes from actual changes in the unemployment differential. 
The effects of a net demand shift towards region 1 is illustrated graphically in Figure 2. 
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2.6 A comparison with the symmetric wage setting 
model 
 
The model of the previous sections implies starkly different predictions from a symmetric 
wage setting model, in which regional wages only respond to the state of the local labor 
market. The model is discussed in length in Layard et al. 1991 and Manacorda and 
Petrongolo 1999 (where it is applied to skills mismatch). Here we simply report the main 
implication of this model, namely that if local wages only depend on local unemployment, 
any net relative demand shift in favor of the North ( 0 D12 > ) would still increase Southern 
unemployment, but would at the same time reduce Northern unemployment. Increasing 
dispersion of local unemployment rates would then imply an increase in aggregate 
unemployment due to the convexity of the wage curve. The model would still account for 
rising unemployment differentials, but its potential to explain changes in aggregate 
unemployment would be dampened. 
Unlike in the symmetric wage-setting model, where regional imbalances affect the 
aggregate unemployment through higher dispersion along a convex wage-setting 
function, the curvature of the wage function does not play a key role when wage setting is 
asymmetric. In this case, the effect of regional mismatch on aggregate unemployment 
simply depends on the magnitude of the unemployment response in region 2. 
 
 
3. The wage equation 
 
3.1 The data 
 
Having ascertained that, under asymmetric wage setting, aggregate unemployment is 
affected by shifts in net demand towards the leading region, we now turn to the empirical 
analysis of Italian wage setting. Specifically, we estimate a wage equation for Italy, using 
information from two data sets for the period 1977 to 1998. Regional employment and 
labor force data are those published by the Central Statistics Bureau (ISTAT, Annuario 
Statistico Italiano, various issues). Data on wages are obtained from the individual 
records of the Bank of Italy Survey of Households' Income and Wealth (SHIW), a 
repeated cross sectional survey.
6 The survey has been run continuously from 1977 to 
1984, then in 1986, 1987 and in every other year thereafter until 1995. There was no 
survey in 1997 but the survey was run again in 1998. 
The SHIW is the only Italian publicly available source of micro data on earnings that 
spans over this long period. We use all the available waves from 1977 to 1998.
7 Over this 
sample period the survey covers 183,382 individuals. We restrict to employees with a 
reported wage, aged 18-65. By restricting to employees only, our sample drops from 
183,382 to 67,222 observations while by further restricting to those aged 18-65 the 
sample size falls to 66,092 observations. Note finally that the SHIW only provides 
information on yearly earnings net of taxes and social security contributions, and inclusive 
of overtime payments and bonuses. We therefore only include full-year employees, which 
                                                 
6The SHIW does not allow to compute ILO unemployment rates, as the only available information on labor 
market status is whether an individual ever worked during the year preceding the survey. For further details on 
the SHIW, see Cannari and Gavosto (1994) . 
7We exclude the 1987 wave, when the variable denoting the region of residence is coded at a somewhat less 
detailed level.  13
leaves us with a final sample of 57,446 observations. Finally, earnings are deflated using 
the national consumer price index with base 1977. 
One of the main advantages of the data set we use is that it provides individual 
information on gender, age, education of workers, and region of residence. Since most of 
the increase in (Southern) unemployment was concentrated among the less educated, 
the youngest and female workers, it seems appropriate to control for the varying 
composition of employment along these dimensions. Failure to do so might induce 
spurious correlation between regional unemployment and wages, simply due to the 
circumstance that where unemployment increases among the less skilled, the average 
wage increases as well, even at fixed individual wages. 
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics of our sample. Worker characteristics are 
computed as averages over the sample period, at the beginning, and at the end of the 
sample. Compared to the South, employees in the North are on average younger, less 
educated, and include a higher proportion of women, arguably reflecting the circumstance 
that Southern unemployment is concentrated among these groups. Trends in these 
characteristics are similar across areas, with an overall increase in educational attainment 
and in female participation. It is difficult to detect any clear trend in the age composition of 
employment: if any, there is evidence of a greater rise in the number of prime age 
workers in the South than in the North. Northern workers earn on average higher wages 
than Southern workers despite the fact that workers in the North are on average younger 
and less educated than those in the South. The raw differential is in the order of 12 





Existing evidence on wage curves supports the idea of a strongly asymmetric wage 
setting mechanism for Italy. Bodo and Sestito (1994) use average contractual wage rates 
for blue collars in manufacturing for the period 1960-1991, and find that the evolution of 
the unemployment rate in the North explains changes in wages both in the North and in 
the South. Very similar results are obtained on firm-level data on average earnings for 
blue collars for the period 1985-1990. Casavola et al. (1995) estimate various 
specifications of a wage equation for Italy on a sample of small firms over the period 
1986-1993 and find that firm-level wages in the South are not affected by the local 
unemployment rate, and only weakly affected by the local male unemployment rate. The 
wage-setting role of the North is also emphasized by Brunello et al. (2000), who estimate 
a reduced-form equation for the Italian NAIRU on aggregate data. The drawback of these 
studies is that they fail to control for individual worker characteristics. 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994, chapter 7) use micro data from the International 
Social Survey Programme for the years 1986 and 1989 and control for observable 
individual characteristics. They find that wages in Italy are responsive to local labor 
market conditions but this result disappears when regional fixed effects are included. It is 
clear that omission of regional dummies simply allows to capture the negative cross-
sectional correlation between local unemployment rates and wages. Where 
unemployment is higher (in the South), wages happen to be lower on average. 
In order to test for an asymmetric model of wage determination, we estimate a wage 
equation of the form  
 
(17) , e u ln ) t ( g x w ln irt t r irt r irt + γ − + β + θ = ∗
′  
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where  i  indexes individuals,  r   regions and  t   years. Clearly   r i∈ , where   1 r =   
(North) ,   or   2 r =   (South)
8. We adopt alternative measures of the unemployment rate  
t u∗  : local unemployment   rt u , Northern unemployment   , u t 1   and Southern 
unemployment   t 2 u . All specifications include regional fixed effects ( r θ ) and control for a 
number of observable characteristics ( irt x ), namely sex, age and education. In order to 
account for regional wage pressure, we include a macroeconomic effect   ) t ( gr   which is 
allowed to vary across regions, and is modelled as a cubic time trend. 
While the twofold regional aggregation adopted greatly simplifies our empirical 
analysis and closely resembles the model of Section 2, one might worry that some 
relevant variation in the data is lost, in turn affecting the precision of our estimates. To 
address this point, we simply look at what portion in the variation of a more disaggregate 
measure of regional unemployment and wages can be explained by the North/South 
divide. We therefore regress the unemployment rate in ten Italian regions (see footnote 7) 
on a constant, a dummy for North, an unrestricted time effect and an interaction of the 
North dummy with year dummies. The regression gives an   2 R   of 90%, suggesting that 
differences between the North and the South pick most of the variation in regional 
unemployment rates. A similar exercise on log wages gives an   2 R   of almost 70%. This 
suggests that little information is lost by moving from a ten-fold to a two-fold regional 
classification. 
Estimation of equation (17) is performed on individual data using a GLS procedure, 
with weights given by the SHIW sampling weights. The presence of variables measured 
at different levels of aggregation on the two sides of the wage equation may induce a 
downward bias in the estimated standard errors. To avoid this problem, we allow for an 
arbitrary variance covariance structure of the disturbances within each group of 
observations, defined at the same level of aggregation as the unemployment variable, 
and correct the estimated standard errors accordingly. So, for example, if the relevant 
unemployment rate is the leading-sector, we cluster the error term by year, while if the 
relevant unemployment rate is the local one, we cluster the error term by year and region. 
Estimation results are reported in Table 2. Column I estimates a leading-region wage-
setting model in which Northern unemployment is included as a regressor: in this 
specification the unemployment variable has the expected negative impact on wages. 
The elasticity of wages with respect to Northern unemployment is about 12% and 
statistically significant at conventional levels. All others coefficients have the expected 
sign: women earn systematically less than men, and earnings rise with age and 
education. In column II we report the estimate for the symmetric wage-setting model, in 
which wages may respond to variations in the local unemployment rate. The coefficient 
on local unemployment is small, just below 6%, and not significantly different from zero. 
Finally, Southern unemployment is included in the specification of Column III, delivering a 
positive but non significant coefficient. 
The specification of column I, in which the North is the leading region, is the only one 
which delivers an estimate of the unemployment elasticity of wages that has the expected 
sign. At the same time, the results of columns II and II lend some additional support to the 
idea that wages nationwide depend on the unemployment rate in the North. Consistently 
with an asymmetric wage setting model, in equilibrium Southern wages depend on local 
unemployment along a labor demand curve: a rise in wages nationwide induced by 
exogenous changes in Northern unemployment implies a reduction in labor demand and 
therefore a rise in Southern unemployment, thus explaining the positive unemployment 
                                                 
8 includes: (1) Piedmont - Val d'Aosta - Liguria, (2) Lombardy, (3) Trentino Alto Adige - Veneto - Friuli Venezia 
Giulia, (4) Emilia Romagna, (5) Tuscany - Umbria - Marches, (6) Latium.  includes: (7) Campania, (8) Abruzzi - 
Molise - Apulia, (9) Basilicata - Calabria, (10) Sicily -Sardinia.  15
coefficient in column III. Since wages in the North are negatively affected by Northern 
unemployment while wages in the South are positively correlated to Southern 
unemployment, on average wages do not respond to the state of the local labor market, 
consistently with the estimates of Column II. 
We have performed several robustness checks on our analysis (not reported in the 
paper). First, we have run the same regressions as in Table 2 on data grouped within 
cells defined by the interaction of sex, age, education and region. This tests the 
robustness of our results to different levels of aggregation of the dependent variable. 
Second, we have experimented with alternative parameterizations of the wage pressure 
term, by including a quadratic and quartic polynomial trend in turn. Third, we have 
estimated the same equations as in Table 2 allowing for a ten-fold regional classification, 
as a opposed to a two-fold one. Fourth, we have included industry and occupational 
dummies as additional regressors. This ensures that our estimated coefficient on the 
relevant unemployment rate is not simply picking the effect of changes in the industrial or 
occupational structure across regions. Fifth, we have included the region Latium in the 
South instead of North. Finally, we have tried to account explicitly for selection into 
employment using a Heckman (1979) two-stage selection model for participation in 
employment (identified by household structure). The results in Table 2 turned out to be 
robust to all these different specification checks. 
Consistently with most of previous work in this area, the results of this section confirm 
the existence of an asymmetric wage setting model for Italy: unemployment rates in the 
North shape wage claims throughout the economy. With respect to the existing evidence, 
we have extended the analysis of the Italian wage curve until 1998, and showed that this 





We next assess the impact of regional mismatch and relative wage pressure on the 
evolution of aggregate unemployment in Italy using the stylized model of Section 2. We 
have argued that, in addition to aggregate forces (that we label aggregate wage 
pressure) plus compositional effects, two sources of regional imbalances can in principle 
be held responsible for in the rise in aggregate unemployment: rises in net labor demand 
in favor of the North and rises in relative wage pressure in favor of the South. We now 
calibrate of the model using the data at hand and try to assess the importance of these 
two factors. 
In Table 3 we report the levels and the annual growth rates of the relevant variables 
for the North (first row), the South (second row), and their difference (bottom row). Over 
the whole sample period, workers in the North account on average for about 70% of the 
employed population (column I), 68% of the labor force (column II) and 71% of the wage 
bill (column IV). Also, wages are on average higher in the North than in the South 
(column III). Estimated trends in these variables illustrate that relative employment has 
been rising in the North and falling in the South (column V) with a growth of about 0.4 
percentage points a year in the North-South differential. Differences in relative supply go 
in the opposite direction (column VI): labor supply increases more in the South than in the 
North, with a fall of approximately 0.2 percentage points a year in the North-South 
differential. Finally, wage differentials fall by about 0.3 percentage points a year in favor 
of the South (column VII). Since relative wages and relative employment move in 
opposite directions, the rate of growth of relative demand (column VIII) is essentially zero. 
However, since supply grows more in the South than in the North, demand net of supply 
grows in the North relative to the South, with a trend of almost 0.3 percentage points a 
year (column IX).  16
With these estimates at hand, we can evaluate the effect of regional mismatch and 
relative wage pressure on Southern and aggregate unemployment, as implied by 
equations (12) and (13), respectively. This exercise is performed in Table 4. Clearly, as 
equation (11) shows, no change in Northern unemployment can be explained by 
imbalances between the two regions. In our model, the northern leading region is fully 
sterilized from sectoral shocks. 
Column I reports the coefficient on the net demand index   12 D   and the relative wage 
pressure term   2 1 dz dz − , which is simply the time average of   2 u 1−   (see equation 
(12)). Shifts in demand, supply, net demand and relative wage pressure are obtained 
from Table 3 and reported in columns II-V of Table 4 for convenience. Columns VI to VIII 
report the estimated effect of each of these forces on Southern unemployment, which are 
obtained by multiplying the values in column II to V by the coefficient in column I. 
Regional mismatch, reported in column VIII, is responsible for an increase in Southern 
unemployment of about 0.25 percentage points a year, which accounts for 40% of the 
actual rise from 10% in 1977 to 22% in 1998. Because there is virtually no change in 
relative demand over this period, the effect of mismatch is almost exclusively attributable 
to shifts in relative labor supply (column VI). Column IX reports the effect of relative wage 
pressure that accounts for a rise in Southern unemployment of about 0.32 percentage 
points a year, i.e. around 53% of the total rise in unemployment in the South. The 
difference between the actual growth in southern unemployment, reported in column XI, 
and the estimated effect of net demand shifts plus changes in relative wage pressure is 
reported in column XII. As equation (11) shows, this term accounts for the effect of 
aggregate wage pressure (plus measurement and labor market errors). The effect of the 
excess wage growth over feasible wage growth accounts for a mere 0.05 percentage 
points change a year in southern unemployment, i.e. around 7% of the actual change. 
In the second row of the Table we report the effect of the same shifts on aggregate 
unemployment. Clearly, the impacts of mismatch and regional wage pressure are equal 
to southern changes, weighted by the time average of the corresponding labor force 
share   l 1−   (see equation (12)), which is equal to 0.319, as reported in Table 3. An 
additional term is included in the Table (row X), representing the compositional effect due 
to changes in labor force in the North relative to the South. Regional mismatch predicts 
an annual rise in aggregate unemployment of about 0.08 percentage points, adding to 
roughly 1.7 percentage points over the whole sample period. This accounts for 
approximately one third of the actual increase in aggregate unemployment from 7% in 
1977 to 12% in 1998. Changes in regional wage pressure account for a rise of about 0.1 
percentage points a year in aggregate unemployment, around 43% of the total actual 
change. Compositional effects also contribute to the rise in aggregate unemployment, 
since labor force rises in the South relative to the North (where unemployment is on 
average lower). The contribution of this compositional effect though is very small, in the 
order of 6% of the total. The residual 20% is explained by aggregate wage pressure.
9 
Although the table makes no specific calculation for Northern unemployment, one can 
easy see from equation (12)  that changes in the unemployment rate in the North can 
only be explained by aggregate wage pressure. Using the estimate of the aggregate 
wage pressure term from equation (13) which is reported in the first row, column XI of 
table 4, and multiplying this term by   ) u 1 /( ) u 1 ( 2 1 − −   this leads to an estimate of the 
effect of aggregate wage pressure on northern unemployment of about 0.050 percentage 
points a years which is very close to the actual change of 0.058 percentage points a year.   
Overall our data suggest that a substantial proportion of the rise in aggregate 
unemployment can be explained by a shift in net demand for labor in favor of the North 
                                                 
9Clearly, the bulk of the increase in unemployment took place before 1989 (see Figure 1). Therefore most of the 
explanatory power of the regional mismatch story also refers to the 1977-1989 sub-period.  17
over the period of observation. Such a shift is mainly explained by changes in relative 
supply. Although we do not dispute that the exogenous rise in wages at the South relative 
to the North had a significant - and quantitatively large - effect on changes in aggregate 
unemployment (in the order of 43%), we attribute to regional mismatch about 33% of the 
total rise in aggregate unemployment in Italy between 1977 and 1998. Interestingly, we 
also conclude that aggregate shocks (aggregate wage pressure) explains only around 
20% of the total rise in unemployment in Italy between 1977 and 1998.





Two natural questions arise in the light of our results. First, what are the economic forces 
that raised net labor demand in the North relative to the South? And, second, why did 
regional imbalances show such a degree of persistence? Several and non mutually 
exclusive explanations can be put forward. 
The answers to the first question lie in a number of adverse shocks that hit Southern 
Italy more heavily than the North since the 1970s. In particular, it is argued that the 
effects of the two oil price shocks were particularly severe in the South, where energy-
intensive sectors covered a larger employment share than in the North. Moreover, the 
dismantling of state owned enterprises that started in the 1980s had stronger effects on 
Southern regions, which relied more heavily on public employment (see Faini 1999). 
Finally, labor supply in the South increased relative to the North, due both to lower 
migration flows from the South to the North and to higher population growth in the South. 
In order to get a sense of the relative importance of migration and population growth in 
explaining changes in regional labor supply, we have decomposed changes in the 
North/South relative labor force into three terms: changes in internal migration rates, 
changes in labor force participation, and residual changes due to mortality and natality 
(plus migration to and from abroad). Our back-of-envelope calculations show that 
changes in internal migration can explain up to 60% of the actual change in relative labor 
supply over the period of analysis (-0.159 percentage points a year), while differences in 
natality and mortality account for around 70% of the actual fall in supply (-0.193 
percentage points a year). Clearly, the sum of these changes predicts a stronger fall in 
relative labor supply than that actually observed (-0.271). This happens because labor 
market participation fell in the South relative to the North (by 0.081 percentage points a 
year), which partly offset the rise in population there.
11   
Concerning the persistence of regional imbalances, the general view on mismatch is 
that it is a short-run phenomenon (see - among others - Layard et al. 1991, chapter 6). 
Any imbalance in demand relative to supply should disappear in the long-run, either 
because labor migrates from the South to the North, reducing labor supply in the South, 
or because increased supply eventually creates its own demand by attracting more firms 
in the South and changing the North/South output mix. 
Several factors may explain why regional mismatch could not trigger substantial labor 
migration towards the North. Among these, a reduction in nominal wage differentials, an 
increase in the housing price differentials, and an increase in income taxation 
progressiveness to the detriment of the North may have played an important role (see 
Attanasio and Padoa-Schioppa 1991). In addition, the sort of enclave mechanism which 
                                                 
10This result however is somewhat sensitive to our specification of preferences. In the appendix we illustrate 
how departures from the Cobb-Douglas assumption may potentially affect our results, which suggests that the 
point estimates of this section should be treated with some caution. 
11In order to make these computations we have used data on net migration rates between the South-West and 
the rest of the country, and between the North-West and the rest of the country in 1970, as provided by 
Attanasio and Padoa-Schioppa (1991), Table 6.4.  18
pulled workers from the countryside in the South to the big industrial gateways in the 
North, where family or friends already lived and worked, came to an end as the 
manufacturing sector started to experience its secular decline in the 1970s, and the 
Government increasingly supported the Southern regions in the form of disability 
pensions and public sector jobs. A further explanation lies in the role of family ties and 
intergenerational transfers. In the (near) absence of unemployment benefits, the male 
head of the household, who is working or in many cases receiving state transfers in the 
form of pensions, acts as a medium of redistribution to the unemployed youths. As the 
evidence goes, youths in Italy live long with their families (see ISTAT 1995) and keep 
relatively high pattern of consumption, often made possible by the economies of scale of 
a shared housing. Young unemployed workers in the South may not be willing to give up 
such a level of consumption for an insecure and relatively badly paid job in the North.
12 
Finally, with scarcity of jobs in the South, but with solid family ties, young Southern 
workers are left with no choice but acquiring extra education. This in turn implies high job 
expectations that become increasingly difficult to fulfill. 
Even with little worker mobility, but with the capacity of increased labor supply in the 
South to create its own demand, regional mismatch would not be as a persistent 
phenomenon. One reason why this may not be the case is that the externalities and scale 
economies deriving from agglomeration (largely emphasized in the new economic 
geography literature, see Fujita et al. 2000) may have prevented firms from relocating to 
the South of Italy, even in the face of increasing unemployment disparities. Firm 
agglomeration is likely to be particularly relevant in Italy, whose economic success is 
often linked to the existence of the so-called industrial districts, i.e. regions that 
accommodate many small firms producing similar goods (Fujita and Thisse, 2002, p. 
268). More than 90% of these industrial districts are located in the North (Paniccia, 2002). 
Two questions that we do not address explicitly in this paper is why wages in Italy 
seem to respond to the state of the local labor market in the North only, and why wage 
differentials shrunk in favor of the South in the 1970s and 1980s. A plausible hypothesis 
is that both these two factors were the result of the explicitly egalitarian aim of the Italian 
trade unions (Cella and Treu 1989). Although it is outside the scope of this paper to 
investigate the reasons why this was the case, it is interesting to observe that such 
egalitarian aim was pursued successfully at least up to the mid 1980s. A tool that served 
this equalizing policy was the Scala Mobile, a wage indexation mechanism that linked 
wage growth to inflation with highly redistributive effects. The existing evidence suggests 
that this played an important role in compressing wage differentials up at least the mid 
1980s (Manacorda 2002), including the differential between the North and the South. A 
second avenue for wage equalization worked through centralized bargaining. It is not 
implausible to speculate that the only way unions were to gain the support of the working 
class, mainly employed in the industrial North, was by linking wage growth to 
unemployment changes there rather than unemployment changes nationwide. 
By focusing on the unemployment effects of persistent regional mismatch in an 
asymmetric wage setting framework, the analysis of this paper has policy implications. 
Policy instruments that are likely to alleviate the effects of regional mismatch include both 
direct measures aimed at reducing regional imbalances between the demand and the 
supply of labor, as well as interventions on features of regional wage setting. From the 
discussion above it follows that, in order to reduce mismatch, subsidies aimed at reducing 
the cost of geographical mobility of labor and capital should be advocated. It is argued 
that reforms of the prevailing wage-setting mechanism would also help insofar they make 
wages more responsive to local labor market conditions than what they currently are. The 
process of wage determination in Italy has undergone profound changes over the 1990s: 
                                                 
12See Bentolila and Ichino (2000), Becker et al. (2001) and Manacorda and Moretti (2002) for the economic role 
of family ties in Italy, and Daveri and Faini (1999) for a study of the role of risk in migration decisions.  19
national wage settlements have been progressively supplemented by firm-level 
agreements (Casadio 1999) and the Scala Mobile has gradually lost importance up to its 
abolition in the early 1990s (Manacorda 2002). Reforms to the wage bargaining system 
that would allow regional unions determine wages in their respective regions might be 
preferable to a single national union determining a differentiated wage for each region 
(see Faini 1999a,b). While in the first case the union would be a monopolist capable of 
discriminating between regions, in the second case there would be stronger competition 
among regional unions and lower average wage pressure. Specifically to our model, 
higher responsiveness of wages to local rather than northern unemployment would 





In this paper we have presented a stylized two-region model of wage determination 
where wages nationwide respond to the unemployment rate in some leading region. A 
strong implication of this model is that the leading region (in our case the North) is 
completely sheltered from sectoral shocks. Regional mismatch therefore has the potential 
to affect aggregate unemployment only via its impact on the unemployment rate in the 
South. 
On the empirical side, we have argued that the gap between the demand and the 
supply of labor in Italy grew in favor of the North between 1977 to 1998, mostly due to a 
faster rise in supply in the South. This trend has the potential to explain increasing 
unemployment differentials between the North and the South. 
We estimate that the effect of regional mismatch is responsible for about 40% the 
increase in Southern unemployment over our sample period, and for one third of the 
increase in aggregate unemployment. Although admittedly this quantitative result 
depends on a Cobb-Douglas specification of consumer preferences, our results remains 
qualitatively true when a more general specification of utility is used (CES). We argue that 
the faster rise in labor supply in the South was due to a combination of two factors: faster 
population growth in the South and declining internal migration. Relative labor force 
participation fell in the South, but this was insufficient to offset the effect of demographics. 
Our analysis also shows that a sizeable proportion (around 43%) of the rise in 
aggregate unemployment in Italy over the period of observation is due to a faster 
(exogenous) rise in wages in the South relative to the North, while only around 20% of 
the total is due to aggregate factors, i.e. a faster rise in negotiated wages nationwide 
relative to the growth warranted by productivity gains. 
The results of this paper shed some additional light on the determinants of the 
regional disparities and their macroeconomic consequences in Italy (and possibly in other 
regions of Europe). At the same time, they highlight some puzzles and new directions for 
research. We argue that the bulk of the regional mismatch problem in Italy stemmed from 
an increase in labor supply in the South, which was not matched by an equal increase in 
labor demand. One is left then with the question as to why migration of labor or relocation 
of firms failed to restore equilibrium in the long run. In the last section of the paper we 
offer some temptative explanations for these facts. This highlights the need for more work 
on the microeconomic determinants of the location choices of Italian firms and workers.  20
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Appendix 
CES utility function 
 
One of the building blocks of our model is Cobb-Douglas preferences. Below we check 
how sensitive our results are to this assumption, by adopting (more general) CES 
preferences. 
Suppose that consumers in both regions have CES preferences over regional goods, 
while the specification of technology in both regions remains unchanged from equation 
(1). Consumers solve the following problem  
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where   ) 1 /( 1 ρ − = σ   represents the elasticity of substitution between the two 
commodities. 
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According to equation (25), the regional mismatch index under CES preferences is  
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In Table A1 we estimate the trend in   σ
12 D   for values of  σ   in the range [0,2]. The first 
column reports the annual change in the South-North unemployment differential. The 
second column reports estimates of   , D12
σ   as the sum of the annual average change in  
1 2 u u −   and the proportional annual average change in   2 1 w / w , multiplied by   . σ   Note 
that, given equation (26),   σ
12 D   represents the part of the change in the South-North 
unemployment differential that can be explained by regional mismatch. 
As  σ   increases, the estimated mismatch index is reduced, due to the higher weight 
on relative wage changes. Since wage differentials evolved in favor of the South, it turns 
out that for high enough values of  σ , relative wage changes overweight changes in the 
unemployment differential and the demand index switches sign. In any case, the change 
in net relative demand is not significantly different from zero for values of   σ   above  
5 . 1.  F o r    0 = σ , corresponding to Leontieff preferences, the demand shift is exactly 
equal to the change in unemployment differentials: relative wage changes do not induce 
any substitution between the two labor inputs. For   5 . 0 = σ , observed demand shifts 
account for approximately 60% of the total change in unemployment differentials. When  
1 = σ , which is Cobb-Douglas case, this accounts for approximately 40% of the rise in the 
unemployment rate differential. Note that such predicted change in   1 2 u u −   is simply 
equal to the rise in   2 u , given that Northern unemployment is not affected by regional 

































 log wages North/South  predicted






Notes: North includes the following regions: Piedmont, Val d’Aosta, Liguria, Lombardy, Trentino Alto Adige, 
Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Marches, Latium. South includes: Campania, 
Abruzzi, Molise, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia. The predicted series of relative wages is 
































Notes. The figure illustrates a net labor demand shift in favor of the leading region of the economy (1). 
Equilibrium in region 1 is given by the intersection of a flat relative wage curve (W) and a downward sloping 
labor demand schedule (D). A demand shift from region 2 to region 1 shifts D up. Relative wages remain 















Variables   1977-98  average 1977    1998 
   North South North South   North South 
              
Ln real wage    3.812 3.751 3.685 3.560 3.827 3.760
Sex Females  36.93 29.24 31.05 25.68 43.07 31.06
  
Education No  schooling  1.43 3.23 5.26 5.22 0.37 1.15
 Primary  school  18.78 20.07 36.67 30.69 7.75 10.66
 Junior  school  35.94 29.47 30.37 28.87 42.32 34.10
 High  school  34.58 34.92 22.31 23.72 38.46 40.24
 University  9.27 12.30 5.38 11.50 11.10 13.86
  
Age  18-20  3.31 2.54 4.85 4.43 1.62 1.03
 21-30  26.60 20.20 27.40 29.98 24.44 15.24
 31-40  28.61 29.93 26.41 24.85 30.59 30.48
 41-50  26.39 27.78 23.72 21.75 30.95 32.23
 51-65  15.09 19.55 17.61 18.99 12.40 21.02
  
No. observations   40,947 16,499 1,851 519 3,444 1,566
  
 
Notes. Source: SHIW individual records, 1977-1984, 1986, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998. North includes the 
following regions: Piedmont, Val d’Aosta, Liguria, Lombardy, Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia, 
Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Marches, Latium. South includes: Campania, Abruzzi, Molise, Apulia, 
Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia. Data are weighted by post-stratification individual weights. Wages are 
defined as take home annual pay net of taxes, social security contributions and inclusive of overtime payments 
and bonuses. Wages are deflated using the national consumer price index with base 1977. Selection criteria: 




Regional wage equations, Italy: 1977-1998 
Two-fold regional classification 













-0.125 (0.063)          
  Local (2 regions)  -0.058 (0.059)    
 
South 
            0.080  (0.112) 
                     
South   13.390 (12.771) 25.527 (20.797) 15.570  (12.911) 
Trend   1.574 (3.701) -2.768 (4.432) -6.843  (4.374) 
 *South  -5.163 (4.364) -9.341 (7.123) -5.911  (4.412) 
(Trend)
2   -0.086 (0.420) 0.397 (0.504) 0.834  (0.500) 
 *South  0.648 (0.495) 1.125 (0.811) 0.733  (0.501) 
(Trend)
3   0.000 (0.016) -0.018 (0.019) -0.034  (0.019) 
 *South  -0.027 (0.019) -0.045 (0.031) -0.030  (0.019) 
                     
Sex Females  -0.267 (0.010) -0.267 (0.008) -0.267  (0.010) 
               
Education No  schooling  -0.434 (0.106) -0.433 (0.098) -0.429  (0.102) 
 Primary    -0.257 (0.112) -0.256 (0.102) -0.252  (0.107) 
 Junior    -0.108 (0.113) -0.107 (0.102) -0.103  (0.109) 
 High    0.065 (0.116) 0.065 (0.103) 0.070  (0.112) 
 University 0.213 (0.112) 0.214 (0.100) 0.218  (0.108) 
     
Age category 21-30  0.256 (0.022) 0.256 (0.026) 0.256  (0.022) 
 31-40  0.418 (0.029) 0.418 (0.032) 0.418  (0.028) 
 41-50  0.517 (0.025) 0.517 (0.030) 0.517  (0.024) 
 51-65  0.526 (0.029) 0.526 (0.032) 0.526  (0.028) 
Constant   -3.834 (10.952) 9.312 (13.094) 22.279  (12.789) 
              
R
2 0.324   0.323   0.323   
    
 
Notes. Number of observations: 57,446. Estimation method: generalized least squares, with observations 
weighted by sampling weights. Estimated standard errors, corrected for clustering, are reported in brackets. 
“South” is a dummy variable for Southern regions. “trend” is linear trend divided by 10. Reference group: North, 
male, missing education, 18-20 years old. For definition of variables and sources see Table 1.  
Table 3 
 
Relative quantities and wages: 1977-1998 
  
 Average  levels
+  Annual Growth rates*100
++ 
































 I  II  III  ￿V  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX=VIII-VI 
                  
 N r/N lr w r/w  αr  dln(Nr/N) Dln(lr)d l n ( w r/w) dln(αr) dln(αr/lr) 
                  
North 0.699  0.681  1.018  0.712  0.117  -0.087 -0.075  0.042  0.129 
 (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.009) (0.008) (0.033)  (0.039) (0.029)  (0.046)  (0.031) 
                  
South 0.301  0.319  0.946  0.284  -0.280  0.185  0.306  0.026  -0.158 
 (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.029) (0.009) (0.078)  (0.082) (0.097)  (0.141)  (0.104) 
                  





                  
North/South        0.397  -0.271 -0.380  0.016  0.287 
         (0.112)  (0.121) (0.125)  (0.186)  (0.134) 
        
 
Notes.  For sources and definitions see notes to Figure 1. Growth rates evaluated by interpolating a 
linear trend in the series of logarithms of relevant variables. The mismatch index D12 is defined in 
equation (7). 
+Standard deviations in parenthesis.  






The impact of regional mismatch and other factors on Italian unemployment: 1977-
1998 
     
          
          
  
    Annual changes in unemployment rates (∗100) 
     
Estimated contribution of 
 Actual   Total 
wage 
pressure 


















     
I  II  III  IV=III-II  V    VI=I*II VII=I*III VIII=I*IV IX=I*V X   XI   XII=XI-
VII-VIII-
VII 





D12 dz1-dz2                   
                           
0.852 -0.271  0.016 0.287 -0.380  South -0.231 0.014  0.245  0.324      0.616    0.046 
(0.043)  (0.121) (0.186)  (0.134)  (0.125)    (0.103) (0.159) (0.114)  (0.126)    (0.053)   (0.040) 
                           
        Aggregate -0.074 0.004 0.078 0.104  0.015   0.241    0.045 
            (0.033) (0.051) (0.036)  (0.034) (0.000)   (0.037)   (0.038) 
                           
  
Notes. The first row computes the separate contribution of changes in relative demand for labor (VI), 
relative supply of labor (VII) and relative wage pressure (IX) in the change in Southern unemployment, 
as implied by equation (12). The difference between the actual change in unemployment (XI) and the 
total explained (VIII+IX) is reported in column XII. This is an estimate of the contribution of aggregate 
wage pressure in explaining Southern unemployment (plus measurement error). The second row makes 
the same computation for aggregate unemployment. The contribution of each factor in explaining 
aggregate unemployment is obtained by multiplying each element in the first row by the average labor 
force share of the South (0.319). An additional term in included in the second row, which accounts for 
the compositional effect of changes in regional labor force composition on aggregate unemployment 
(X).   
 Table A1 
 
The impact of regional mismatch on North-South unemployment differentials 
for alternative values of σ . 
 
Actual annual change  
in u2-u1 (*100)  
Predicted annual change in u2-u1 (*100)  
(Estimated impact of regional mismatch) 
  
  Elasticity of substitution (σ ) 
  0  0.5 1 1.5 2 
        
0.557 0.557  0.367  0.241  -0.013  -0.204 
(0.061)  (0.061)  (0.079) (0.112) (0.186) (0.246) 
 
 
Notes.  The table reports the implied change in unemployment differentials due to 
regional mismatch under the assumption of CES preferences, for alternative values 
of  σ , using the expression  () . w w ln d u u d D 2 1 1 2 12 σ + − = σ  Standard errors in 
parenthesis.  